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2. The definition of moral turpitude adopted by the court is broad
enough to include any unjust, immoral, or dishonest act by the attorney.
3. Subdivision 2. of R.C.M. 1947, sec. 93-2026 provides for disciplinary action for any wilful violation of the attorney's oath of office.
4. The court has the inherent power to regulate its officers and
to promulgate and enforce all necessary and appropriate rules for such
regulation.
SAM E. HADDON
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DUE PRocEss.-Defendant was charged in three seperate indictments for
state narcotics violations. As defendant had previously been convicted
for narcotics violations, the state sought to increase punishment under
Maryland's habitual criminal statute.' Each of the three indictments
alleged the facts of the principal offense and also the details of the
prior convictions. At the beginning of the trial the complete indictments
were read to the jury, and during the trial the prior convictions were
proven. The jury convicted the defendant of the principal crimes, and
found the prior convictions to exist as an historical fact. Pursuant to
these findings, the trial court sentenced defendant as a third offender.
Appealing these convictions to the Maryland Court of Appeals, defendant
contended that it was improper to acquaint the jury with his criminal
record at the outset of the trial. This contention was rejected,2 and the
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.3 Defendant then petitioned the federal district for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he
had been deprived of a fair and impartial trial as required by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The petition was denied
on the basis of Maryland decisions upholding the procedure of informing
the jury of previous convictions during the trial for the principal
offense. 4 On appeal to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, held,
reversed. Informing the jury of defendant's prior criminal record at
the outset of the trial destroyed the jury's impartiality. Such procedure
is prejudical to the defendant and renders the conviction invalid.
Lane v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 320 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1963).
Nearly all states have enacted habitual criminal statutes which provide that prior convictions can be used to increase punishment for a
subsequent offense.5 In Montana, for example, if a person has a previous
conviction for an offense punishable by five years imprisonment, his
sentence for a subsequent conviction is increased to a minimum of ten
'MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 300 (1957) provides that a sentence is to be increased on
a subsequent conviction for narcotics, where defendant has prior narcotics convictions.
2This was one of ten assignments of error presented on appeal. The convictions were
affirmed in Lane v. State, 226 Md. 81, 172 A.2d 400 (1961).
'368 U.S. 993 (1962).
'Lane v. Warden Md. Penitentiary, 207 F. Supp. 780 (D.C. Md. 1962).
'For a list of these jurisdictions see 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 645 (12th ed.
Published1955).
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years: 6 In some jurisdictions, a "three-or-four-time-loser" may be imprisoned for life.7 The purpose of these statutes is to impose more severe
penalties on those who persist in violating the law after previous convictions.8
Utilization of habitual criminal statutes requires a procedure for
the pleading and proof of the prior convictions in addition to the principal offense. The jury must be informed of the alleged prior convictions, and must find as an "historical fact" that the accused has committed them.9 To impose the increased penalty, this finding must be
made before the defendant is sentenced. However, the question of at
what point during the trial the procedure should be invoked has lead
to major differences in the procedure for prosecuting habitual criminals
adopted by the various states.
In the instant case the Maryland court followed the common law
procedure for prosecuting habitual criminals. 10 Under the common law
procedure, allegations of former convictions are set forth in the indictment or information charging the accused with the principal offense.
At the commencement of the trial the entire indictment or information

is read to the accused in the jury's presence. If the defendant pleads
not guilty to the former conviction, it must be proved concurrently

with the principal offense." When the jury finds the defendant guilty
of the principal offense, and further finds that the prior convictions

have been established as an "historical 2 fact," the additional sentence
may be imposed as provided by statute.'

A majority of jurisdictions adhere to the common law procedure
for prosecuting habitual criminals.'3 Some courts interpret a statute to
6

The Montana statute for increased punishment after conviction of a former state
prison offense provides that if the second offense were punishable by more than
five years as a first offense, as a second offense it is punishable by not less than
ten years imprisonment (This clause provides no maximum sentence, and punishment thereunder can be equilivant to life imprisonment) ; if the first offense were
punishable by five years or less, the second conviction is punishable by not more
than ten years imprisonment; and if the second conviction is for petit larceny or an
attempt to commit any offense punishable by not more than five years as a first
offense, the second conviction results in a sentence not to exceed five years. REVISED
CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 94-4713. See also § 94-4714. (REVISED CODES OF MONTANA are hereinafter cited R.C.M.)

'See, e.g., N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1942 (third offender); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-10 (1957)
(fourth offender); see R.C.M. 1947, § 94-4713, note 6 supra.
8
Joyner v. State, 158 Fla. 806, 30 So. 2d 304 (1947). Habitual criminal statutes
have withstood attacks on their constitutionality, as they "do not create an independent crime but merely define a status, prescribing circumstances under which there
is an enhanced penalty for the present crime."
Comment, 33 N.Y.U.L. REV. 210
(1958). In this regard, it has been held that an accused cannot be charged as an
habitual criminal as such status is not an independent crime. State v. Zeimer, 10
Utah 2d 45, 347 P.2d 1111 (1959). Prior convictions have no connection with the
principal offense except to determine punishment in the event of conviction, and
there is no question of former jeopardy. 5 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
§ 2218 (1957).
9
See note 12 infra.
"°Maryland adopted the common law procedure in Maguire v. State, 47 Md. 485 (1878).
"If defendant admits the commission of the former violations, some jurisdictions nevertheless allow the jury to be informed of them. See note 18 infra.
""The jury do not find the person guilty of the previous offense; they only find
that he was previously convicted of it, as a historical fact.'' Maguire v. State, note
10 at 497.
"Comment, 33 N.Y.U.L. REV. 210 (1958).
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require the common law procedure, or, allow its application in the
absence of statute. 1 4 Pleading and proof of the prior conviction during
the trial for the principal offense has been sanctioned for various reasons.
The practice is often permitted on the theory that a prior conviction is
not an independent offense which must be tried seperately, but rather
is an essential element of the offense charged which must be established
before the imposition of the increased sentence. 15 Many courts emphasize
the jury's functions of determining facts and assessing punishment.
These courts reason that the jury must be fully apprised of the exact
nature of the charges in order to perform these functions :16
Why should not the whole indictment be read to the jury, including that part containing the allegations of the former convictions
and judgement? The jury being the judges . . . as to whether
the offense had been committed as charged, they should certainly
be informed of what they are sworn to try; and for that purpose, no means are so proper as the reading of the indictment
itself.
The Montana Supreme Court sustained the common law procedure in
State v. O'Neill. 7 In that case defendant admitted to the court, before
the beginning of the trial, that he had committed the prior offenses, but
contended that knowledge of the prior convictions would prejudice
the jury against him, and requested that his record be withheld from
the jury unless he was found guilty of the principal offense. The trial
court denied the motion, and the Montana court affirmed, 8 holding
that a prosecutor is required by statute to state the case and offer
evidence to support the allegations in the information. 9 The previous
convictions are considered part of the case to the extent of aggravating
4

ARiz.

REV. STAT. ANN., RULES CRIM. PROC., RULE 134 (1956); IND. ANN. STAT. §
9-2208 (1956); IOWA CODE § 747.4 (1958); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-147 (1953); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 40-2803 (1955); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-11 (1957).
Maine interprets
its state constitution to require the common law procedure. State v. MeClay, 146
Me. 104, 78 A.2d 347 (1951). For states where the common law procedure is applied
without interpretation of statute, see, e.g., Coleman v. State, 215 Ga. 865, 114
S.E.2d 2 (1960).
"State v. Meyer, 258 Wis. 326, 46 N.W.2d 341 (1951); Doyle v. State, 138 Tex. Crim.
502, 137 S.W.2d 26 (1940). Some courts argue that the common law procedure is
essential in order to give notice to defendant of the nature of the charges against
him. State v. Laird, 25 N.J. 298, 135 A.2d 859 (1957).
16
Maguire v. State, note 10 supra at 495; accord, State v. Holman, 88 Ariz. 280, 356
P.2d 27 (1960); Higgins v. State, 235 Ark. 153, 357 S.W.2d 499 (1962); State v.
Waterhouse, 209 Ore. 424, 307 P.2d 327 (1957); State v. Ruble, 77 N.D. 79, 40
'

N.W.2d 794 (1950); People v. Lawrence, 390 Ill. 499, 61 N.E.2d 361 (1945).
1776 Mont. 526, 248 Pac. 215 (1926).

"See, e.g., Berry v. State, 51 Ga. App. 442, 180 S.E. 635 (1935). Other states following the common law procedure do not permit the jury to be informed of the prior
convictions if the accused admits them. This logically follows because the admission
eliminates the need for proof of the prior convictions. State v. Meyer, 258 Wis. 326,
46 N.W.2d 341 (1951).
"The Montana court was interpreting R.C.M. 1947, § 94-7201 which prescribes the
procedure for conducting criminal trials. In State v. Gall, 135 Mont. 131, 337 P.2d
932 (1959), the court held that the above statute was directory only, and therefore did
not require reading an information to a jury. That case did not involve the prosecution of an habitual criminal, but it would seem to modify the O'Neill case to the
extent that reading the information to the jury would be within the court's discretion.
In State v. Brown, 136 Mont. 382, 351 P.2d 219 (1959), the trial court ordered
withdrawal of prior convictions from the information because the prosecutor stated
that they could not be proven.
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the penalty, and it is necessary for the jury to be informed of the
complete charge "in order intelligently to exercise the right to fix
punishment to fit the crime."112 0 In dismissing the contention of prejudice,
the court noted that withholding such information also would deny the
jury its right to fix punishment.
Several jurisdictions following the common law procedure have
nevertheless recognized that prejudice may result from the jury's knowledge of prior convictions. 21 These courts reason that any prejudice is
overcome by admonitions or instructions to the jury that the prior
convictions have no bearing on the principal issue, and are to be considered only for the purpose of imposing
punishment if the accused is
22
found guilty of the principal offense.
It may be true .

.

. that it is prejudicial ....

If prejudice there

be, it is a necessary result of setting forth [the charge] in the
manner required by law . . . . Proper instructions by the court
as to the purpose and effect . . . of former convictions will

protect [defendant's] legal rights.
The assumption that prejudicial effects can be negated by admonitions or instructions to the jury "all practicing lawyers know to
be unmitigated fiction. ' 23 It is readily apparent that the common law
procedure for prosecuting the habitual criminal presents a great risk
of creating prejudice in the minds of the jury; knowledge of the prior
convictions may convey the impression that the accused has a propensity
for committing crime. Whether or not the accused has this propensity
should not impair his right to an impartial trial on the offense charged.
England recognized the prejudicial effects of the common law procedure over one-hundred years ago and abandoned it in favor of a statute
providing that an accused must be found guilty of the principal offense
before prior convictions can be made known to the jury.24 This procedure

was adopted by the Connecticut court in the leading case of State v.
Ferrone:25
It cannot be believed that an accused man would ever have a
fair trial resulting in a verdict not affected by prejudice or by
considerations by which the jury should not be influenced, if
during that trial allegations that he has twice before been convicted of state prison crimes have been read to the jury, and
evidence of his former convictions has been placed before them.
It is beyond question that knowledge of such facts must necessarily prejudice the minds of his triers against the accused, and
cause him... serious injury....
2'Supra note 17 at 534.
2'Waxler v. State, 67 Wyo. 396, 224 P.2d 514 (1950) ; State v. Meyer, note 18 supra.
22State v. McClay, note 14 supra at 353. Most jurisdictions grant a mistrial if a
defendant has been prejudiced by overemphasis on proof of prior convictions during
the trial. See Annot., 144 A.L.R. 240 (1943).
"Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949).
2'PItEVIOUS CONVICTION ACT, 1836, 6 & 7 Will. 4, ch. 111.
2196 Conn. 160, 113 Atl. 452, 457 (1921).
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An accused is presumed innocent and a prosecutor must establish
guilt with evidence material and relevant to the specific crime charged.
Only on such evidence can the jury find a defendant guilty.2 6 Therefore, the law excludes evidence of collateral issues tending to degrade
or prejudice an accused; as such would divert the jury's attention from
the specific issues, tend to assert that the accused is likely to have
committed the crime, and thereby affect the verdict. Former crimes
are never allowed for the purpose of supplying substantive evidence of
the principal offense, because "a man is not to be convicted of one
crime by proof that he is guilty of another." 27 Habitual criminal
statutes were not intended to controvert these principals, but a procedure
which informs the jury of defendant's prior convictions at the outset of
the trial circumvents the policy considerations behind them.
The court in the instant case held that informing the jury of defendant's prior convictions pursuant to the common law procedure violated
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As applied to
state criminal proceedings, that clause guarantees to the criminally
accused the right to a fair trial before an impartial jury. 28 Violations
of this right constitute a denial of due process and justify federal
interference with a state criminal conviction. Due process is denied
when "that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice"
is disregarded in the conduct of a criminal trial.29 It is elementary that
a jury's impartiality is one of the most essential ingredients of a fair
trial.
The court in the instant case pointed out that the due process clause
does not establish a criteria for determining impartiality. However, that
clause has been held to contemplate a jury having "no fixed opinion
concerning the guilt or innocence of the one on trial," and whose verdict
is based on facts submitted to the court.30 Impartiality is destroyed by
such facts certain "to weight too much with the jury and to so over",31
persuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general record ....
In applying this general test, recent federal cases have held that a
jury's knowledge of former crimes automatically destroys impartiality.
In Marshall v. United States, a jury's exposure to newspaper stories
concerning defendant's former convictions was held to preclude a fair
2[ [T]he prosecution may not introduce evidence of other criminal acts of the accused
unless the evidence is substantially relevant for some other purpose than to show
a probability that he committed the crime on trial because he is a man of criminal
character." McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 157 at 327 (1954). Exceptions to the rule are
discussed in that section. The most widely recognized exception permits prior convictions for the purpose of impeaching defendant's character after he has placed
it into issue. The court in the instant case observed that the effect of the common
law procedure is to violate this exception because it attacks defendant's reputation
before he has initiated the inquiry.
2

State v. Ferrone, note 25 supra at 457.
"Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
2Chavez v. Dickson, 280 F.2d 727, 735 (9th Cir. 1960).
8°Instant case at 185. The court was quoting from Baker v. Hudspeth, 129 F.2d 779,
781-782 (10th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 681

(1942).

"Instant case at 185. The court was quoting from Michelson v. United States, 335
U.S. 469, 476 (1948).
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trial. 2 Prejudicial effects were also implied from a confession which
referred to other crimes, 8 and from a statement made by an officer
to a juror that the accused was serving time for another offense. 4 Thus,
the federal courts recognize a tendency among jurors to subconsciously
rationalize that if the defendant did it before, he would do it again.
To assure impartiality, information regarding former offenses before
determination of guilt or innocence on the principal charge should be
withheld from the jury.
The court in the instant case noted that the disclosure of the
prior convictions to the jury was unnecessary and could have been
easily avoided. The court discussed methods of procedure adopted by
other jurisdictions which are designed to eliminate the dangers of
prejudice. These states also recognize that the habitual criminal statutes
do not create an independent crime, but treat the pleading and proof
of the prior convictions seperately for the accused's protection. An
increasing number of jurisdictions, either by statute 5 or judicial opinion, 6 have substantially adopted the following procedure for implementing habitual criminal statutes:
(1)

The indictment or information is divided into two parts:
the first sets forth the principal charge; the second, separable from the first, contains the allegations of the prior
convictions.

(2)

The entire indictment or information is read to the accused
and his pleas are taken in the jury's absence.

(3)

Only the part containing the principal charge is read to the
jury. During the trial, no mention is made of the prior
convictions in the remarks of the prosecutor,
by the evi8 7
dence, nor by the court's instructions.

(4)

When the jury retires to consider the verdict, only the first
part is given to them.

-360 U.S. 310 (1959). The United States Supreme Court, exercising its supervisory
powers over federal courts, declared a mistrial even though the jurors had asserted
that they were not prejudiced by the information.
'United States v. Jacangelo, 281 F.2d 574 (3rd Cir. 1960).
"Holmes
v. United States, 284 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1960).
5
CAL. PEN. CODE § 1025 (West); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.11 (1961); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 610.31 (1947); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-19 (1953); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 6130 (1961). In the instant case, after defendant's convictions had been
affirmed by the state court, the Maryland Legislature enacted a statute abandoning
the common law procedure. See MD. CRIM. PROC., Rule 713 (1961). For a statute
requiring the trial judge to determine the fact of the prior conviction, and then
submit the finding to the jury for its determination of punishment see Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 556.280 (as amended 1959).
T
State v. Johnson, 383 P.2d 326 (Idaho 1963); Harris v. State, 369 P.2d 187 (Okla.
1962); Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 397 Pa. 575, 155 A.2d 825 (1959); Beeler v.
State, 206 Tenn. 160, 332 S.W.2d 203 (1959) ; Heinze v. People, 127 Colo. 54, 253 P.2d
596 (1953); State v. Kirkpatrick, 181 Wash. 313, 43 P.2d 44 (1953). Other jurisdictions hold that the trial judge must make the determination of whether the accused
committed the prior offenses. Kennedy v. State, 171 Neb. 160, 105 N.W.2d 710
(1960); Walker v. State, 38 Ala. 204, 84 So. 2d 383 (1955); LeVell v. Simpson, 142
Kan. 892, 52 P.2d 372 (1935), cert. denied 297 U.S. 695 (1935).
t7
This procedural requirement would not restrict the admissibility of evidence relating
to prior convictions under recognized exceptions to rules of evidence. See note 26
supra.
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(5)

If the jury returns a verdict of guilty on the principal
charge, the judge explains that the defendant will then
be tried as an habitual criminal for the purpose of increasing his punishment. The second part of the indictment
or information is then read to the jury, and evidence is then
presented to establish the historical fact of the alleged
prior convictions.

(6)

The jury then retires to assess the punishment within the
limits prescribed by statute for the principal offense. If
defendant is also found to have committed the previous convictions, it may impose the enhanced penalty as provided
by the habitual criminal statute.

If defendant admits the prior convictions and pleads not guilty
to the principle offense, the same procedure is applied except that a
38
seperate hearing is not required for proof of the prior convictions.
It is submitted that the rationale of the court in the instant case
gives those jurisdictions adhering to the common law procedure added
impetus to consider the adoption of the foregoing procedure. As discussed above, Montana is included among the majority of states which
apply the common law method to prosecute habitual criminals. The
suggested procedure protects the accused from the prejudical effects
of prior convictions which the court in the instant case found violative
of the due process clause. The case clearly indicates that federal courts
will interfere with state criminal proceedings in order to protect the
constitutional right to a fair and imparital trial.39 Therefore, convictions
procured under the common law habitual criminal procedure face
invalidation by the federal courts.
In view of the supervisory power of the federal courts, an eventual
change in the Montana procedure is inevitable. The most satisfactory
way to accomplish this necessary change is by the enactment of a
statute which clearly sets forth the suggested procedure. At present,
the Montana Criminal Code 40 is undergoing revision by a Criminal Law
Commission appointed by the Supreme court. 4 1 That commission should
take cognizance of the result in the instant case and propose a statute
substantially identical to the procedure outlined above. The suggested
procedure has proven successful in other jurisdictions, and its enactment
by the Montana Legislature is strongly urged.
JOSEPH E. REBER
safeguarding the rights of the accused, such procedure does not offend any
principle of orderly procedure nor tend to delay justice. In fact it may well expedite
justice, for if a defendant is acquitted on the substantive charge, there is no occasion
to take time to present evidence of prior convictions. If the jury renders a verdict

"'While

of guilty, then the second phase of the trial should be conducted before the same
jury unless the defendant waives a jury trial on such matters."
State v. Stewart,
110 Utah 203, 171 P.2d 383, 387 (1946).
"See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
"°R.C.M. 1947, tit. 94.
"The 1963 Montana Legislature empowered the Supreme Court to recommend changes
in the Montana Criminal Code through the creation of a Criminal Law Commission.
Laws of Montana 1963, ch. 103 at 202.
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THE ESTATE OF TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY IS NOT A RECOGNIZED MODE OF
OWNERSHIP IN MONTANA.-A husband and his wife were conveyed real

property "as joint tenants with the right of survivorship and not as
tenants in common." Subsequenty, they were divorced. Two years
after the divorce, the husband died. He was survived by his wife and
various brothers and sisters. The latter, the appellants, brought the
action to quiet title, contending that the deed created a tenancy by the
entirety and that when the grantees were divorced, the tenancy was,
by operation of law, converted into a tenancy in common. The trial
court held that a joint tenancy was created and that the wife took by
right of survivorship. On appeal, held, affirmed. The Montana Supreme
Court stated that the tenancy by the entirety is not recognized in Montana. Thus, the deed could create but one type of estate, a joint tenancy.
Clark v. Clark, 387 P.2d 907 (Mont. 1963).
Beginning in the 14th or 15th century in England, two or more persons were able to own concurrent interests in the same estate in land.
Three types of these interests form the basis for the modern law of coownership of real property.
Tenancy in Common. In this co-ownership, there is but one
unity, that of possession. The right to possession of the whole
of the estate belongs to all of the cotenants, yet, each cotenant
has a separate and distinct interest in the property. The interest
of one tenant may either be unequal to that of the others,
acquired at a different time and by a different instrument, or
conveyed by one tenant without the consent of the others. Unlike the other two concurrent interests to be considered, the right
of survivorship is not an incident to a tenancy in common. On
the death of one of the cotenants his interest passes to his
heirs.'
Joint Tenancy. The creation of a joint tenancy requires four
unities, that of time, title, interest and possession. There must
be but one interest created by one instrument. The interest of all
of the cotenants must commence at the same time and be held
under one possession. If one of the four unities is lacking, the result is a tenancy in common. Thus, joint tenants are seized of a
share and also of the whole. The right of survivorship is the most
important aspect of the joint tenancy. When one of the tenants
dies, the entire estate remains in the survivors. Neither the
widow or heirs of the deceased tenant nor his creditors have any
claim against the enlarged interest of the surviving tenants.
One joint tenant, without the consent of the other tenants, may
alienate his interest. This transfer severs the interest conveyed
from the joint tenancy. The transferee holds as a tenant in
2
common with the remaining joint tenants.
'MOYNIHAN,

INTRODUCTION TO REAL PROPERTY

224-225 (1962);

2 AMERICAN

LAW

OF PROPERTY § 6.5 (Casner ed. 1952).
MOYNIHAN, supra at 216-223; 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra §§ 6.1 - 6.4.
Under the common law theory of the "title mortgage" where title to the property
is transferred to the mortgagee, the execution of the mortgage severs the joint
tenancy. A conflict has risen as to the effect of a 'lien mortgage" executed upon
a joint estate. California has taken the position that the. execution of a "lien mort-

2
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